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On 9–10 December 2020, International IDEA, together with the Edinburgh Centre for 
Constitutional Law and the Political Settlements Research Programme at the University of 
Edinburgh, and with financial support from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & 
Development Office, hosted the Seventh Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict 
Constitution-Building. The event considered the ways in which Covid-19 pandemic 
emergency law responses have affected peace and transition processes in conflict-affected 
countries.
1.1. States of emergency, Covid-19, and peace processes and 
transitions
The World Health Organization declared the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic on 11 
March 2020. This global health crisis demanded a quick, decisive and efficient response by 
governments to protect lives, curb the spread of the virus and prevent public health systems 
from being overwhelmed (Ginsburg and Versteeg 2020; Grogan 2020). Governments in 
many countries have triggered emergency legal frameworks to disable some ordinary 
(democratic) procedures and set aside standard political and legal accountability mechanisms 
as part of their Covid-19 response. Elections have been postponed and sometimes cancelled, 
and central governments have assumed enhanced responsibilities, which have often included 
powers otherwise designated to local or regional governments. While the impacts of both the 
pandemic and the responses to the contagion have been felt globally, they often have quite 
different consequences in countries attempting peace and democratic transition processes.
This report defines countries that have (or have had) peace and democratic transition 
processes as those with conflict resolution processes underway, those that are in the early 
stages of implementing a peace settlement, and those that are post-conflict but where the 
legacies of past conflict remain politically salient and liable to reversal. The Seventh 
Edinburgh Dialogue focused on societies undergoing ‘twin  transitions’, which are loosely 
defined here as societies in which intertwined yet distinct transitions from authoritarianism 
to democracy, and from conflict to peace, are being attempted simultaneously. The former 
can be defined as political processes that attempt to establish or renew democratic 
participation in place of authoritarianism, while the latter typically involve an attempt to 
forge a ceasefire and a new political settlement between conflict protagonists. Such twin 
transitions frequently involve a distinct triangle of actors, as Figure 1 drawn from the work of 
the Political Settlements Research Programme’s  Jan Pospisil and Monalisa Adhikari (n.d.) 
demonstrates.
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Figure 1. Actors in twin transitions
Source: Pospisil, J. and Adhikari, M. ‘Twin transitions: critical junctures of democratization and peacebuilding’, 
[n.d.],  unpublished.
The Dialogue examined a number of case studies of states that have experienced (or are 
undergoing) twin transitions, including Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Myanmar, 
Nepal and Sri Lanka (the latter does not involve a negotiated settlement, or any 
straightforward transition). These countries are at different stages of transition, which enables 
useful insights on the potential impact of Covid-19 in societies with various experiences of 
democracy and peacebuilding. This report also draws on a range of other conflict-affected 
settings in order to consider the potential ramifications of responses to Covid-19 on both 
conflict and democracy more generally. The Dialogue was driven by a range of questions and 
considerations that are relevant for all conflict-affected settings (and often all countries more 
generally), but particularly emphasize transitions.
1.2. Key questions for conflict-affected settings
The Seventh Edinburgh Dialogue focused on four key questions.
1. What kind of emergency law responses to Covid-19 have been adopted in conflict- 
affected settings? Why have particular responses been adopted over others, and what 
have been the effects of emergency powers on conflict dynamics? Have emergency law 
responses attempted to improve (or been successful at improving) relationships in 
these settings? What has been the role of institutions? Have courts and parliaments 
been able to curb executive overreach, and what has been significant in terms of the 
wider conflict dynamics? For countries at the formative stages of transition or those 
still experiencing conflict, has Covid-19 affected the process? Does the level of conflict 
influence a country’s approach to adopting an emergency law?
2. Covid-19 has significantly disrupted electoral democracy in general, but given the 
complicated issues pertaining to the sequencing of elections as part of a transition (see, 
e.g., Paris 2004; Alihodžić and Matatu 2019) how has this affected transitional 
countries? What impact has Covid-19 had on scheduled elections and/or the need to 
extend terms of office in case of a delay? What is the relationship between Covid-19, 
conflict dynamics, and elections and extensions? Has the severity of the pandemic in 
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particular countries played a role in whether postponement has been considered or 
not?
3. Many conflict-affected states experience transitions in which different types of conflict 
and political settlement challenges operate at the central state and sublevels. Covid-19 
emergency responses have the potential to impact the relationship between the centre 
and periphery as well as the political autonomy of substate entities. In conflict-affected 
settings, additional questions emerge regarding (a) how centre–periphery dynamics in 
twin transitions have been impacted by Covid-19 and (b) the role of non-state actors 
in these processes. Have opportunities arisen for substate governments to demonstrate 
leadership and the capacity to respond to the contagion specifically and emergencies 
more generally? Has the pandemic presented opportunities for these actors, 
particularly in the peripheries, to enhance their legitimacy by demonstrating 
leadership and capacity where the government has been unable or unwilling to do so? 
Have states’ responses shifted the dynamics or relative leverage of these groups, and/or 
altered the credibility between these groups and formal/state actors?
4. There is always the risk that emergency powers will become normalized or permanent. 
This risk may be compounded by the social, economic and political 
disenfranchisement resulting from emergency measures in conflict-affected countries. 
Covid-19 is putting pressure along pre-existing fault lines in many post-conflict and 
transitioning states. How much of the emergency legal response to Covid-19 is likely 
to become permanent, or at least to endure beyond the immediate exigencies of 
dealing with the pandemic? What implications does this have for longer-term conflict 
resolution dynamics? When and how should donor or third-party states supporting 
conflict resolution understand and respond to prolongation as a threat to 
democratization and conflict resolution?
1.3. Structure of the report
This report proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 examines the different ways in which emergency 
law responses can be instituted with reference to conflict-affected settings. After outlining 
models of emergency powers, chapter 3 considers some of the potential reasons underlying 
why states have opted for different approaches. Chapter 4 examines how emergency law 
responses have affected transitions. Chapter 5 assesses the potential impacts of delayed 
elections in conflict-affected settings. Chapter 6 explores the effects of Covid-19 responses on 
relations between the state and substate actors, and chapter 7 outlines a number of key 
findings and recommendations.
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2. Emergency law responses in the context of 
Covid-19
A state of emergency is the special legal regime of powers and rules that is brought into 
operation when a country is facing a grave threat. Normal laws are often circumvented under 
a state of emergency, and special and extraordinary measures are enacted (Kouroutakis and 
Ranchordás 2016: 31). Covid-19 responses have indicated different ways of institutionalising 
an emergency response. Three main approaches to enacting emergency measures in response 
to Covid-19 were discussed: (1) rely on constitutional provisions that permit emergency 
approaches; (2) interpret existing legislation to provide the basis for emergency measures or 
adopt new legislation; and (3) legally ambiguous approaches that have a less explicit legal 
basis, such as executive measures that lack (or appear to lack) a specific legal grounding. The 
rest of the chapter discusses each approach in turn.
2.1. The constitutional model
Constitutions often, but not always, define the situations that can trigger a legal state of 
emergency. Such grounds commonly include war, insurrection, threats to national security 
and natural disaster—and sometimes health emergencies. For instance, Madagascar declared 
a two-week State of Health Emergency on 21 March 2020, based on article 61 of the 
Constitution. Where health-related grounds are not expressly addressed in the constitution, 
provisions have sometimes been interpreted to include a health emergency (for example in 
Colombia  under article 213 of the 1991 Constitution, because the pandemic constituted a 
serious disruption of the public order that imminently threatened the state’s  institutional 
stability and security or citizens’  peaceful coexistence). Other states have lacked the 
constitutional basis for declaring a state of emergency to respond to Covid-19.
In the context of the pandemic, states of emergency differ in terms of the procedures that 
need to be followed and the substance of both what constitutes an emergency and the scope 
of authorized government action, but each authorizes a range of flexible powers and 
corresponding measures to address the pandemic. Grogan (2020) identifies four common 
elements of constitutional provisions on a state of emergency: (1) conditions for its 
declaration; (2)  a delegation of power; (3)  limitations on its use; and (4) provisions  for 
legislative or judicial oversight. For instance, the constitution might require parliament to 
authorize a state of emergency either before it can be declared or within a specified period of 
time following the declaration. For instance, article 88 of Liberia’s Constitution states that:
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The President shall, immediately upon the declaration of a state of emergency, 
but not later than seven days thereafter, lay before the Legislature at its regular 
session or at a specially convened session, the facts and circumstances leading to 
such declaration. The Legislature shall within seventy-two hours, by joint 
resolution voted by two-thirds of the membership of each house, decide whether 
the proclamation of a state of emergency is justified or whether the measures 
taken thereunder are appropriate.
Similarly, article 29(3) of Sierra Leone’s Constitution stipulates that a state of emergency 
expires after 21 days if it is not approved by parliament. Constitutions frequently place 
temporal constraints on a state of emergency to prevent their normalization, and parliaments 
may be required to approve any proposed extensions, sometimes through an increased 
majority approval threshold. In Mozambique, article 284 of the Constitution specifies that a 
state of emergency can have a maximum length of 30 days and can be extended up to three 
times.
Courts and parliaments can be entrusted to scrutinize both procedural compliance and 
substantive measures adopted under a state of emergency. Under the constitutional model, 
the scope of emergency powers can also be constrained. For instance, while in most cases 
some derogation of rights is permitted, constitutions will frequently include a subset of rights 
that cannot be ignored regardless of the emergency. To illustrate, article 286 of 
Mozambique’s Constitution provides that ‘The declaration of a state of siege or emergency 
may in no case limit or suspend the rights to life, personal integrity, civil capacity and 
citizenship, non-retroactivity of criminal law, the right of defence of defendants and freedom 
of religion.’  In theory, declaring a state of emergency ensures that emergency powers are 
assumed and exercised within a legal framework, albeit one that differs from the normal 
constitutional arrangements. Examples of conflict-affected states in transition that have 
adopted a state of emergency in response to Covid-19 include Chad, Colombia and Ethiopia.
2.2. The legislative model
Some states have relied on ordinary legislation to provide the legal foundation for emergency 
measures, either alone or in combination with a constitutional state of emergency. In much 
the same way as a constitution, an act or statute can confer wide-ranging powers on the 
executive or specific institutions to adopt emergency measures. In response to the unique set 
of circumstances raised by the contagion, some states have opted to pass new legislation to 
provide the basis for a range of emergency measures. For example, after initially declaring a 
state of emergency, the government of Papua New Guinea  passed the National Pandemic 
Act of 2020.
Alternatively, some states have interpreted existing laws as providing the basis for 
emergency responses to the pandemic. Many countries have relied on public health laws to 
enable sweeping powers for detention, quarantine and even lockdown. For example, the 
Kenyan  Public Health Act of 1921 is the country’s primary legislation applicable to public 
health crises. It authorizes public health authorities, particularly the Minister of Health, to 
take various actions during public health crises, including declaring a disease a ‘notifiable 
infectious disease’ or a ‘formidable epidemic, endemic or infectious disease’ and taking the 
necessary prevention and suppression measures to fight it. In Myanmar, the main legal bases 
for measures such as curfew orders and the restriction of rights has been section 14 of the 
Prevention and Control of Communicable Diseases Law and section 144 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code. In Nepal, the primary legal grounding for emergency measures has been the 
1964 Infectious Disease Act. The South African Disaster Management Act of 2002 has been 
used to legally justify many of the country’s emergency responses. Other countries have relied 
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on laws that cover disasters or public order more generally (such as the Zimbabwe Civil 
Protection Act of 1989).
A defining feature of the legislative model is that ‘however unusual it may be, emergency 
legislation remains ordinary within the framework of the constitutional system: it is an act of 
the legislature working within its normal competence’ (Ferejohn and Pasquino 2004: 215). 
In theory, using legislation ought to ensure compliance with overriding public law and rule 
of law principles. For example, such laws ought to incorporate formal values such as clarity, 
non-retroactivity, publicity, universality of reach, and the possibility of compliance and 
congruence between expressed law and official enforcement. Legislation should include limits 
on executive power, for instance in the form of sunset clauses, which are statutory provisions 
enacted for a limited time and expire unless they are extended. For example, Kenya’s Public 
Order (State Curfew) Act of March 26 (1), which contains provisions for a countrywide 
curfew, was initially declared for a period of 30 days. All later extensions of the emergency 
measures had a limit date. Legislation must also ordinarily be drafted and applied in non- 
discriminatory ways. Enabling legislation promulgated in response to Covid-19 has often 
been fast-tracked and therefore lacks the level of scrutiny that would normally be expected. 
Under the legislative model, ex post  scrutiny of legislation can ensure that the responses are 
proportionate and protect human rights. One important point is that in the context of 
Covid-19, the extent to which existing legislation provides the basis for the types of measures 
that have been adopted is often uncertain.
2.3. Ambiguous groundings
Some countries have assumed and exercised emergency powers without a clear legislative or 
constitutional foundation. For instance, in the Central African Republic, the National 
Assembly did not enact any special or ad hoc legal measures to support these measures. 
President Touadéra exercised de facto exceptional powers during the early stage of the 
Covid-19 crisis. In Rwanda, national and local lockdowns have been implemented on the 
basis of presidential statements and Cabinet resolutions without requiring parliamentary 
approval or formal allowances as set out in the Constitution. Somalia has taken measures to 
combat Covid-19 without referencing specific legal instruments. During the early stages of 
the pandemic, the Sri Lankan Government imposed an island-wide lockdown with no clear 
legal basis to justify the measures taken. Subsequent measures adopted in Sri Lanka such as 
the pervasive deployment of the serving military and the ad hoc appointment of senior ex- 
military personnel to civil administration roles have raised serious concerns that the 
pandemic is increasing the militarization of the government. This raises questions as to the 
legality of emergency measures subsequently enacted. Indeed, there is a danger that without a 
pre-established legal framework, governments’ power will be unconstrained and unregulated.
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Table 1. Examples of initial emergency law responses in conflict-affected settings
Country Constitutional state of emergency Amended, existing or new legislation Uncertain
Cambodia X
Central African Republic X
Colombia X
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3. What explains choices of emergency law 
responses in conflict-affected settings in 
transition?
There is no overarching explanation of why conflict-affected states in transition, or indeed 
any state, have adopted a particular legal approach. There are a range of factors underlying 
such choices; some of which may be applicable to all countries, others may be more specific 
to conflict-affected and transitioning societies, and still others particular to the context in 
question. Decision-makers in each setting are likely to have multiple reasons, which are 
informed by the distinct histories, legal traditions, institutional strengths and structures, 
political ecosystem, prevalence of the pandemic and perhaps even level of conflict in the 
country. This chapter outlines possible drivers underlying the choice of legal framework(s).
3.1. The legal frameworks in place
A country’s  emergency law response is determined by the available legal options. In some 
cases, states do not have a constitutional provision to declare a ‘state of emergency’. In other 
cases, the pandemic did not constitute an ‘emergency’  within constitutionally permitted 
grounds. In such scenarios, the instrument adopted to facilitate emergency measures might 
be explained by the inability to resort to a constitutional state of emergency. For example, in 
Uganda, the constitutional grounds to declare a state of emergency (section 110) do not 
include disease; it therefore based its response on the Public Health Act of Uganda (Cap 281, 
2000).
3.2. Political calculations and institutional safeguards
The overview of the enabling bases for emergency law responses suggests that, at least in 
theory, different levels of oversight are associated with different models. This might explain 
the attractiveness of certain emergency law responses over others. For instance, a state might 
wish to ensure that it acts—and is perceived to act—in ways that are constitutionally sound 
and adhere to the rule of law. To this end, declaring a state of emergency can trigger a set of 
procedural constraints and oversight mechanisms that could facilitate such legitimacy. As 
noted by Lührmann and Rooney (2020: 8):
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If the use of such emergency powers is constrained to truly existential threats to 
the nation, or if the state returns to its standard institutions after the emergency 
subsides, the state of emergency has performed its function well, and democracy 
has remained unchallenged.
Similarly, existing legislation may be advantageous or even necessary from a democratic 
legitimacy perspective because it is enacted during normal institutional operations and under 
normal procedures for deliberation and review. At the same time, invoking a state of 
emergency can trigger a set of procedural constraints and oversight mechanisms that some 
executives wish to avoid. A recent report by International IDEA (2020b: 7) concluded that 
most governments in East Africa have primarily utilized legislative measures and executive 
orders to deal with the health crisis owing to ‘a reluctance to utilize constitutional authority 
to declare states of emergency, as these often presumably involve greater levels of 
parliamentary oversight’.  Similarly, in South Sudan, government measures were not 
announced within the context of a state of emergency in terms of article 189(1) or 101(e) of 
the Transitional Constitution, 2011 (as amended). Acting under these articles would have 
required legislative approval since it would constitute a state of emergency. Instead, the 
country’s response has been grounded in decrees without parliamentary approval.
Some states have not declared a state of emergency due to political unwillingness, where 
leaders downplay or underestimate the threat of Covid-19. A study by Meyer (2020) found 
that populist leaders of some of the largest democracies have not taken the pandemic 
seriously enough. The governments of Timor-Leste (O’Connor  2020) and Indonesia (Al 
Jazeera 2020a) have been condemned for being unresponsive in the context of Covid-19, 
which further endangers the society. In transitioning societies, there may be an impetus to 
assure those who are critical of the government and/or any peace settlement that the situation 
is under control. As developed below, in some cases the pandemic has provided opportunities 
for non-state actors to increase their legitimacy and support in their response to the 
contagion. This could motivate state actors to downplay the virus to limit the space for other 
actors to step in. The primary point for the present purposes is that, alongside public health- 
related concerns, executives have had to weigh a range of factors and interests, including 
economic aspects.
Similar calculations might surround decisions to rely on legislation. While a legislative 
basis for emergency response may be advantageous or even necessary because it is enacted 
under a normal institutional framework, this might also explain why alternative approaches 
are adopted. For instance, where existing legislation is used but amended, the more limited 
capacity to review and debate amendments (for example in Nepal) might contribute to this 
choice being made over a state of emergency declaration, not least because of differences in 
the level of oversight applied to the two types of frameworks. In the same vein, countries that 
have acted without a clear legal basis (such as Cambodia, Sri Lanka and  South Sudan) 
might have done so in order to limit the executive’s accountability to oversight institutions— 
primarily parliament and the courts—as generally demanded under both states of emergency 
and legislation frameworks.
3.3. Histories of emergency regimes
Many societies have past experience of emergency powers, which might influence the 
approach adopted. Lührmann and Rooney (2020: 4) assess that ‘the decision to implement 
[a state of emergency] derives from historical experiences such as international conflict, 
internal discord, and economic crisis, amongst myriad other factors’.  Certain approaches 
might also be characteristic of individual states in line with their legal traditions. In Latin 
American states such as Colombia and  El Salvador, it is common to declare a state of 
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emergency in response to a crisis. Yet states of emergency have a long history of being 
unevenly applied to national minorities and political opponents in conflict-affected settings 
and more generally (Bell 2020). These histories could explain decisions about whether to 
adopt new legislation or rely on existing laws. Given the spectrum of responses observed 
around the world, it is difficult to draw general conclusions about the origins of emergency 
law response choices.
3.4. Pandemic unpredictability
The emergency law response might also be dictated by the pandemic itself. This can be 
demonstrated by examining the variations in legal responses of various countries as the 
severity of the pandemic has evolved. Angola, for instance, declared a state of emergency on 
27 March, enacted through Presidential Decree no. 81/20 of 25 March. This was in line with 
the state of emergency legal framework as laid down in the country’s Constitution and in 
Law 17/91 of 11 May 1991. It was extended three times through presidential decrees, and 
remained in place until 25 May, and was then terminated. From then on, a state of public 
calamity became effective, enacted by presidential decree (Lexology 2020).
3.5. Level of conflict and impact of Covid-19
A country’s emergency law response might be affected by the relationship between the level 
of conflict and the impact of the pandemic. For example, high levels of conflict and low 
prevalence and impacts of Covid-19 might deter the declaration of a state of emergency. 
Where conflict is still ongoing or specific areas of conflict remain, this becomes an important 
factor in the emergency law response. Dialogue participants observed that Covid-19 has not 
featured in the same ways in Yemen and Syria as in other settings. This might be explained 
by various factors, including a lack of verifiable data on rates of Covid-19 infections and 
deaths, as well as the fact that conflict is still ongoing in many parts of the country, which 
limits the government’s  reach and capacity to enforce laws and rules; in any case, broad 
executive powers tend to operate with little constitutional constraint. Therefore, there are 
competing priorities, and declaring a state of emergency might simply have been deemed less 
pressing than other matters or even undercut perceptions of government capacity. By 
contrast, low levels of conflict but a high impact from the pandemic might warrant triggering 
a constitutional state of emergency. The two dimensions introduce possible connections 
between the level of conflict and the perceived importance of (and capacity to address) the 
pandemic.
3.6. The political settlement
The nature of the political settlement in place may also influence the decision to adopt a 
particular approach. In identity-based conflicts, for instance, the political settlement can 
often involve some degree of power sharing between former conflict protagonists. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’s power-sharing arrangement included an executive grand coalition at the 
federal level. In such instances, the approach to the emergency adopted may be shaped, to 
some degree, by political negotiations or contestations within the established political 
framework. This can be contrasted with other contexts in which power has been 
concentrated in the hands of a single executive office holder, when bottom-up pressure might 
be a factor. The two substate political entities that comprise Bosnia and Herzegovina (the 
Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), declared a state of 
emergency in line with their substate constitutions prior to the federal government’s nation- 
wide declaration. The former did so on 4 March 2020, while on 17 March 2020 the latter 
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declared a ‘state of natural disaster’ to enable coordination of emergency activities between its 
two autonomous regions.
3.7. Summary
The range of potential emergency law responses adopted in conflict-affected states in 
transition reflect wider global trends and country-by-country variations (see Grogan 2020). 
While the precise reasons for adopting a particular approach are difficult to pinpoint, there 
are a number of common characteristics. Executives in conflict-affected settings might also 
have had to consider additional factors, such as ongoing conflict or the system of government 
and constitutional arrangements agreed in a political settlement forged to end or contain the 
conflict. In all cases, the precise motivations for the choice of emergency law response are 
context specific. Future research should explore these motivations.
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4. How have emergency law responses affected 
transitions?
The pandemic triggered early optimism in conflict-affected settings, which envisioned 
potential intrastate and transnational opportunities for collaboration and mutual assistance to 
combat the virus (Bell 2020; Polo 2020). Such views partly stemmed from previous 
experience with the way in which external shocks—variously termed critical junctures, 
windows or opportunities, or constitutional moments—have sometimes brought opposing 
factions together in pursuit of a higher objective. Examples include the 2015 earthquake in 
Nepal, which created a sense of urgency that motivated the country’s political parties to come 
to an agreement on the new constitutional dispensation following the failure of past 
negotiations, and the 2004 Asian tsunami which renewed the resolve of parties to the long- 
standing conflict in Aceh, Indonesia to forge a negotiated settlement. The ways in which 
emergency powers are used can either support or hinder transitions. For instance, when 
executive measures are necessary, proportionate and non-discriminatory, transitions can be 
supported by demonstrating the government’s  willingness to protect its citizens. Where 
decision-making is inclusive of political opponents and civil society, executive measures can 
be used to reflect the goals and aspirations of democratic deliberation.
Nevertheless, emergency powers carry risks regardless of the type of emergency. These 
include the risk of government inaction such that, despite emergency powers, adequate steps 
are not taken to tackle the virus, or certain sections of society are ignored. They also include 
the risk of normalizing emergency powers, a problem known as ‘the normalization of the 
exception’ because the exception has become the norm and the distinction between normal 
and exceptional conditions has broken down (Welikala 2020a; Gross 1998; Ní Aoláin and 
Gross 2006). A recent Freedom House study shows that democracy and human rights have 
deteriorated in 80 countries since the pandemic began (Repucci and Slipowitz 2020).
While these dangers exist for all societies, conflict-affected states in transition face 
additional complexities. For instance, they often have significant fault lines: executive actions 
are therefore likely to cause a backlash among supporters, the opposition and non-state 
actors. A history of conflict can also heighten the impact of emergency measures, particularly 
those that involve a significant transfer of power to the centre or the military. The stage of 
constitutionalism and democracy will also affect the extent to which executive measures can 
be curtailed. Therefore, alongside the normal concerns associated with emergency law 
responses during emergencies, the wider context and backdrop of transition magnifies 
potential issues. The discussion below considers a number of widely identifiable trends in the 
use of emergency powers from the perspective of twin transitions.
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4.1. Executive powers and institutional safeguards
Some leaders have sought to utilize the pandemic to further entrench pre-existing 
authoritarian tendencies. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the president flatly refused to recall the 
parliament that had been dissolved ahead of elections, even though the Constitution clearly 
requires such a recall in circumstances such as a pandemic. The Supreme Court, in what 
appears to be an act of extreme deference to the executive during a pandemic, also denied 
leave to proceed with multiple challenges to the president’s  refusal to act according to the 
Constitution. The result was that the pandemic facilitated an executive takeover of the state.
There is also a danger that expanded executive powers might become normalized in less 
visible ways. For instance, much of the pandemic-related legislation passed in countries 
around the world does not include sunset clauses, and is therefore of uncertain duration. The 
underlying legal instrument in Nepal is still being used to adopt national-level responses with 
no provisions on termination. Governments can also adopt various—and often fast-tracked 
—legal instruments as the pandemic persists, which could entrench emergency powers. 
While the risk of expanding and normalizing emergency powers is not unique to countries in 
transition, there are additional problems associated with these developments working against 
negotiated settlements that are often predicated on a redistribution of power.
Box 1. Examples of courts constraining emergency powers
In Brazil, the Constitutional Court has intervened to prevent President Bolsonaro from understating the risks 
associated with Covid-19. In Kosovo, the Constitutional Court ruled that the government could address the 
pandemic through ordinary law rather than resorting to emergency law. In El Salvador, the Supreme Court ruled in 
May 2020 that President Nayib Bukele had overstepped his powers by declaring a state of emergency in order to 
extend stringent lockdown measures without congressional approval. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina concluded that prohibiting the movement of persons under 18 years of age and over 65 on the 
territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina violates the right to freedom of movement under article II(3) 
(m) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The potential to misuse or abuse emergency powers emphasizes the importance of strong 
institutions. There are numerous examples of institutions, such as courts, curbing emergency 
powers during the pandemic (see Box 1). However, the institutional apparatus is often weak 
in conflict-affected settings in transition, providing insufficient scrutiny of the executive. The 
reasons for limited oversight vary. For example, as discussed above, in some cases 
institutional oversight incapacity might be explained by the choice of legal framework. 
Where emergency powers are assumed outside of a constitutional or legislative framework, 
there is less scope for legislatures and courts to limit the activities of the executive. Some 
oversight limitations result from the pandemic itself, since it has restricted the ability of 
parliaments around the world to convene and conduct business in person, including in 
conflict-affected settings in transition. In some countries, parliaments have been formally 
suspended or dissolved. North Macedonia’s  parliament did not convene between its 
dissolution on 12 February and the snap election on 15 July. By the time of the election, the 
country’s  president had declared a state of emergency five times, allowing the caretaker 
government to rule by decree.
A key aim in transitioning societies is to establish effective checks and balances on power. 
However, the evolving nature of this process can hinder institutions’ capacity to effectively 
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constrain executive power even in normal circumstances, but particularly when faced with 
exogenous shocks. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, observers have 
criticized the Constitutional Court for failing to rule unconstitutional the president’s failure 
to obtain approval for a state of emergency from both the Senate and the National Assembly, 
as required by law (Makunya 2020). In other cases, the limited role of institutional oversight 
can be explained by the lack of progress in establishing the institutions necessary to contain 
executive action. For instance, a State of Health Emergency was declared in Sudan, 
supported by articles 40–41 of the Constitution. The declaration of a state of emergency is 
not legitimate if the Legislative Council does not ratify it. However, Sudan does not have a 
legislature and therefore the emergency response could not be approved as required by its 
Constitution.
4.2. Disproportionate encroachment on rights
Although some degree of rights restrictions is necessary and legitimate in response to the 
contagion, in transitioning societies, infringements on rights can be a point of tension and 
potentially conflict. Human rights guarantees are often a central feature of both democracy- 
building and peace processes (Parlevliet 2017). Joshi, Lee and MacGinty (2014) find that at 
least 90 per cent of comprehensive peace agreements include provisions related to at least one 
of the following: human rights, refugees/internally displaced persons, or minority/indigenous 
rights. The institutionalization of human rights is partially driven by a belief in the power of 
these normative concepts to address historical exclusions, marginalization and/or indifference 
(Bell 2017).
Human rights protections are therefore a central feature of transitions to both democracy 
and peace. For instance, horizontal inequalities between groups, whereby certain sections of 
the population have their rights protected while others are marginalized, can be a conflict 
trigger. Human rights violations are often, if not always, a cause and consequence of conflict. 
Peace negotiations therefore place human rights centre stage to ensure that the same 
violations which precipitated, and may arise from a renewal of conflict, are not replicated, in 
addition to ensuring the function of human rights as a bulwark against state and non-state 
actors’ excesses. Yet expanded executive powers in emergency situations can lead to human 
rights violations, which is particularly significant in contexts in which such violations are 
understood to have implications for the conflict landscape. There are reported cases of 
infringements on the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, privacy, and liberty in 
contexts such as Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.
In conflict-affected settings in transition, indifference, discrimination or favouritism— 
particularly towards a particular group—can also hamper transitions by increasing existing 
tensions. Dialogue participants reported disparity in the support offered by Sri Lanka’s 
ruling elite to Prime Minister Rajapaksa’s base compared to that offered to minority areas, 
especially in the north, which are being ignored. Assistance schemes are centralized and 
decided by a task force headed by the military that focuses on groups loyal to the Prime 
Minister. Religious discrimination is also taking place, particularly against Muslim burial 
practices (Kolvani et al. 2020: 3). In Ethiopia, the national emergency ended in September 
2020, but the public health measures continue, including significant restrictions on public 
meetings. These measures tend to disproportionately affect the opposition because of 
selective enforcement. In other cases, marginalization and discrimination can hamper salient 
aspects of the transition, even decades after the negotiated settlement. In Bosnia 
Herzegovina, for instance, there are reports of discrimination against refugees (Kolvani et al. 
2020), though their protection and return was a central component of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement.
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Authoritarian tendencies overlap with pre-existing vulnerabilities and the marginalization 
of certain groups and interact in unpredictable ways. For instance, Ní Aoláin (2020) has 
identified how the policing of adherence to pandemic-related regulations has exacerbated 
discriminatory patterns of abuse in the use of force. Noting epidemiological evidence across 
states, Ní Aoláin contends that Covid-19 is causing disproportionate deaths among 
minorities and other historically vulnerable groups. This raises the prospect that ‘the tools of 
the surveillance state and the use-of-force capacity of government would be further mobilized 
against those communities, who already distrust law enforcement and other security forces 
and have long histories of harm at their hands’ (Ní Aoláin 2020). The omission of executive 
intervention, either in general or towards specific sections of the population, can significantly 
undermine the perceived legitimacy of the state.
4.3. Securitization of the state
Many countries have increased the role of the military in their response to Covid-19. In some 
cases, this represents an extension of pre-pandemic efforts to further militarize civilian roles. 
For instance, the Philippine  government’s pandemic response has been highly militarized: 
the security forces have detained thousands of people for violating curfew and have killed 
many individuals. President Duterte has deployed police and military forces to enforce 
emergency measures; the military is ordered to kill violators of lockdown rules (Patel 2020). 
In Sri Lanka, the Government has accelerated efforts to populate government roles with 
military figures. Health decisions are now made by those who have experience fighting a war, 
but have no health administration experience. Many of these individuals played a key role in 
the war efforts, and several face serious allegations of human rights violations. Therefore, all 
key individuals with decision-making power are either military or former military and are 
very closely aligned with the president and his regiment. Where pandemic response efforts 
are dominated by security personnel, this often means they are led by and focused on men; 
women are not only excluded from decision-making spaces and processes; women’s specific 
needs in relation to the pandemic, as well as those of sexual and gender minorities, are often 
ignored (Campbell and Jolliffe 2020: 3).
In other cases, the use of the security apparatus is problematic due to the roles played by 
the military during and prior to conflict and potential disruptions to ongoing security sector 
reform efforts. For instance, an unfinished aspect of Nepal’s  peace process has been 
democratizing the army. Processes have focused on ensuring civilian control of the army and 
its compliance with human rights. However, the government has relied heavily on the army 
in its response to Covid-19. The army, rather than the Health Ministry, was put in charge of 
procuring medical supplies, setting up and managing quarantine centres, and transporting 
people, among other tasks. South Sudan’s Covid-19 response has been led by a High-Level 
Taskforce chaired by the President and deputized by First Vice President Dr Riek Machar. 
The taskforce includes national security services, the Ministry of Interior and the defence 
forces, the role of which is to enforce measures adopted by the taskforce including controlling 
borders and enforcing compliance with testing and contact tracing. Similarly, in Sudan 
differences between civilian and military leaders in the transitional, power-sharing 
government are growing. The military has been consolidating its authority through restrictive 
security measures that went into effect in April 2020, including a ban on public gatherings 
and protests around the country, with particularly harsh restrictions imposed in the capital, 
Khartoum. Covid-19 has also brought chaos to Sudan’s  troubled economy, which has 
damaged the transitional government’s credibility and popularity.
Alongside the increased role of security personnel in the pandemic response, the nature of 
military interventions also raises important human rights concerns. Once again, the 
securitization of the state is not unique to conflict-affected settings in transition. There are 
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examples of repressive security apparatus responses from countries that have transitioned to 
democracy. For instance, in Kenya, the police have killed at least 15 people—including a 13- 
year-old boy standing on the balcony of his family’s home—to enforce the dawn-to-dusk 
curfew instituted at the beginning of the outbreak (Al Jazeera 2020b). However, in conflict- 
affected states undergoing transition or conflict-affected states more generally, state security 
forces have negative connotations of both conflict and eras presiding the onset of violence. 
When understood against the backdrop and histories of conflict, such repressive actions can 
undermine state institutions and prevent a break with the past.
Finally, the increased role of the security apparatus in the pandemic response can affect 
ongoing peace processes, particularly where a conflict is ongoing. Hege (2020) assesses that 
Colombia’s police and military have become overstretched after taking on a range of new 
roles related to the pandemic. They have also been rocked by several prominent scandals, and 
rural communities view them as potential transmitters of the virus, which further undermines 
trust (Hege 2020).
Although many countries called upon their security forces to help manage the pandemic, 
securitizing the fight against the contagion can also erode the quest to build constitutionalism 
and peace in transitioning settings. Poor governance of the security sector is often a source of 
conflict and a key obstacle to peacebuilding. Security forces are often the agents of state 
repression and have been associated with major human rights abuses. Democratization is 
often impossible without a transformation of the security sector’s institutions and methods of 
oversight and control. Security sector reform is therefore a key aspect of transitions, and a 
country’s use of its security apparatus must be understood in context.
4.4. Opportunities for non-state actors to exploit
While all societies have tensions and fault lines between groups, in conflict-affected settings 
these can manifest as actors and groups willing to challenge the state. Governments in many 
conflict-affected countries are struggling to handle the health crisis and have been forced to 
divert resources away from counterinsurgency efforts. In some settings, rebel groups have 
used this as an opportunity to step up attacks against a weakened opponent, including by 
undermining the government’s health response by targeting hospitals and healthcare workers 
(Polo 2020). For instance, the so-called Islamic State has ramped up its activities in both 
Iraq  and Syria  (Mustasilta 2020). Similarly, the Houthi movement in Yemen  has 
weaponized the pandemic as an opportunity for new recruitments, taking advantage of the 
Saudi ceasefire declared in a bid to stem the spread of the virus (Schiavi 2020). In Colombia, 
the pandemic only intensified the country’s myriad subnational conflict dynamics. Armed 
groups and criminal networks have adapted quickly to changing circumstances, seizing on 
the national quarantine to fortify their control over communities in their own localized and 
brutally repressive lockdowns under the guise of preventing the spread of the virus (Hege 
2020).
The approach of non-state actors can itself be a reaction to government inaction or overly 
repressive responses. Militias, parastatal groups and other non-state actors are seizing 
opportunities to increase support and credibility by exploiting the inadequacies of state 
responses (Blanc, Brown and Press 2020). Heavy-handed or repressive government responses 
can fuel pre-existing fault lines contributing to political grievances deriving from perceived 
inequalities and marginalization, which can be gamed to gain support from the civilian 
population. The perceived weakness or inadequacies of state responses can also create 
opportunities for non-state actors or de facto authorities to fill governance gaps by spreading 
health information and enforcing quarantines for residents returning from abroad, as well as 
establishing public health information teams, dispensary campaigns and even quarantine 
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centres (Asal, Flanigan and Szekely 2020). In some instances, this creates vacuums for illicit 
organizations.
In conflict-affected states in transition, the dynamics between state and non-state actors 
generated by existing fault lines can play out in unpredictable ways. As part of its response, 
the Myanmar Government formed a coordination and cooperation committee to work with 
ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in the fight against Covid-19. Importantly, given the 
country’s  history with military rule and the broad constitutional powers granted to the 
military to engage in politics and domestic affairs, the civilian authorities have led the 
response to the pandemic. By reacting quickly and seeking to include ethnic minorities, the 
approach is reported to have garnered broad popular support for civilian leaders, including 
among many ethnic minorities. The procedural and institutional approach to the pandemic 
in Myanmar has shifted the dynamics of civilian government–EAO relations and trust in a 
positive direction that, at least before the military coup of 1 February 2021, might have 
helped strength the peace process over the long term.
Paradoxically, the increased governance functions of non-state actors can also present 
opportunities to build bridges with state actors. For instance, some EAOs in Myanmar have 
well-established parallel administrations in their areas of influence, which include their own 
police forces, border agencies and prison systems; some also have their own health 
departments. Accordingly, some EAOs have set up Covid-19 committee structures that are 
responsible for leading public health responses in their areas of influence, and they have 
strengthened border security in an attempt to control the spread of the disease (Campbell 
and Jolliffe 2020: 5). The state could use this institutional capacity and reach and integrate it 
into broader pandemic response frameworks.
4.5. Discussion: deepening conflict fault lines
Although transitioning societies are a diverse category with different states at different stages 
of transition, these contexts are arguably more vulnerable to the effects of emergency 
measures. This is partly due to their particular histories of conflict and the potential for 
ongoing violence. However, it is also the result of fault lines: executive measures invoke 
different context-based reactions and are interpreted through a particular lens. Moreover, 
even in societies not experiencing twin transitions, Covid-19 could risk exposing these fault 
lines and making a regression from peace to conflict or democracy to authoritarianism more 
likely. The Myanmar case also demonstrates the unpredictability of conflict-affected settings. 
Across the globe, state institutions have shown themselves to be both willing and capable of 
limiting executive overreach and underreach. Prior studies have demonstrated that a primary 
determinant of how emergency powers will be used is the existence of capable institutional 
safeguards (Grogan 2020). However, in transitioning societies, this raises questions about the 
state of transition, as well as the institutional framework as part of these efforts to progress. In 
addition, conflict-affected settings in transition are susceptible to wider trends including 
democratic regression and the difficulties raised by the pandemic such as institutional 
oversight.
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5. Elections
The pandemic has affected elections globally. On the one hand, there is a democratic 
imperative to hold elections on a periodic basis in line with the timetable set by law and to 
ensure that government—at all levels—has the legitimacy that comes from a democratic 
mandate. On the other hand, governments have the responsibility to protect lives by 
following the guidance of health authorities and creating a safe environment that enables 
people to exercise their right to vote without risking their health (Banbury 2020).
In transitioning societies, elections are instrumental in conferring legitimacy on a 
government and are frequently viewed as the end goal of any negotiated transition and a key 
step towards democratization (Alihodžić and Matatu 2019). Since the end of the Cold War, 
they have become the primary mechanism for regulating political contestation among 
conflict parties emerging from civil war through a negotiated settlement. Given the salience 
of elections in transitioning societies, there are competing perspectives on the effect of using 
emergency measures to suspend or delay them. Some argue that delaying elections can 
support democracy because of lower turnouts as a result of the pandemic and the fact that 
transitioning societies will likely struggle to deal with the risks they pose to the population. 
Others maintain that carrying on with elections can guarantee democracy by ensuring that 
leaders are popularly elected. Both arguments can be defended from a democracy standpoint.
Table 2. Examples of elections held during the pandemic
Country: type of election Date the election was held
Mali: General elections 29 March 2020
Myanmar: General elections 8 November 2020
Burkina Faso: General elections 22 November 2020
Central African Republic: Presidential and legislative election 27 December 2020
Niger: Presidential and legislative election 27 December 2020
Source: International IDEA, ‘Global overview of COVID-19: Impact on elections’, 8 March 2020a, <https:// 
www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-impact-elections>, accessed 8 March 
2021.
However, elections also interact with conflict dynamics in unpredictable ways. Covid-19 
dynamics have been an important part of the context, if not always a decisive element. 
Ethiopia’s National Electoral Board announced on 31 March 2020 that the parliamentary 
elections scheduled for 29 August 2020 would need to be postponed due to Covid-19. On 
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10 April, parliament approved a five-month state of emergency that gave the executive 
sweeping powers to battle the virus. The delay has had a significant impact on the country’s 
post-conflict transition. When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ran for office, he promised 
reconciliation for all Ethiopians. The opposition demanded to be politically involved in the 
transition period leading up to the next elections but was given no formal role. By 
postponing the general elections indefinitely, the current government and parliament will 
remain in power until the end of the pandemic. Although citizens broadly understand that 
postponement was necessary, they interpreted it as particularly beneficial to the federal ruling 
party. Some opposition groups, particularly the Tigray’s People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), 
maintained that the decision was ‘gamed’. This has exacerbated tensions between the federal 
government and the Tigray politicians, who resigned after accusing Abiy of authoritarian 
tendencies. Moreover, the authorities’  decision to provide no formal role for opposition 
groups during the interim governance of the country (pending elections) exacerbated tension 
with leaders of the principal Oromo opposition (the biggest region in the country where the 
government was expected to face tense competition). The delayed elections therefore fed into 
a volatile political climate and provided the catalyst for renewed conflict.
Myanmar’s elections were held on schedule; the National League for Democracy (NLD) 
won in a landslide. The NLD’s handling of the pandemic is thought to be partly responsible 
for its victory, as was party leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularity among the majority of the 
population, and the perception that the NLD is the only effective option to continue the 
transition(s). However, this victory reflected the significant deterioration of the military’s 
influence in the country and led to the January 2021 military coup. These examples 
demonstrate the unpredictability of transitioning societies and the potential for fault lines to 
emerge.
Table 3. Examples of countries that have delayed elections during the pandemic
Originally scheduled Rescheduled Held?
North Macedonia: Parliamentary elections 12 April 2020 15 July 2020 Yes
Sri Lanka: Parliamentary elections 25 April 2020 5 August 2020 Yes
Autonomous Bougainville Papua New Guinea: General 
elections
June 2020 12 August–1 September 
2020
Yes
Kenya: County Assembly and National Assembly by-elections June–July 2020 15 December 2020 Yes
Ethiopia: Parliamentary election 29 August 2020 5 June 2021
Indonesia: Regional (local) elections 23 September 2020 9 December 2020 Yes
Zimbabwe: Legislative and council by-elections 5 December 2020 2021
Chad: Legislative elections 13 December 2020 24 October 2021
Source: International IDEA, ‘Global overview of COVID-19: Impact on elections’, 8 March 2020a, <https:// 
www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-impact-elections>, accessed 13 March 
2021.
Decisions to delay elections often call into question both the legality of the decision and its 
constitutional implications. For instance, Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa took office with an 
opposition-majority parliament. He dissolved parliament on 2 March, which is permitted 
under Sri Lanka’s  Constitution, and called for new elections on 25 April.  However, 
article 70(5) of the Constitution stipulates that the first meeting of the new parliament must 
be held within three months of the election. The elections were pushed back to 20 June, and 
again to 5 August,  due to Covid-19. Opposition parties and civil society representatives 
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challenged the revised date through at least eight petitions, flagging possible public health 
risks in holding polls during the pandemic. Citing article 70(5) of Sri Lanka’s Constitution, 
they argued the Parliament had to be summoned not later than three months after the 
proclamation dissolving the House (by 2 June) to avert a ‘constitutional crisis’. The top court 
dismissed the petitions, which warned that the failure to summon parliament would produce 
a constitutional crisis (Srinivasan 2020). The delay in holding elections left Sri Lanka 
without a functioning parliament—and the Rajapaksas without any check on their power— 
for over five months (Welikala 2020b).
In the Central African Republic (CAR), presidential and legislative elections were due in 
December 2020 and March 2021, respectively. By March 2020, it was evident that due to 
Covid-19, it may not be possible to hold the elections within the constitutionally required 
deadline. The 2016 Constitution, however, imposes a two-term limit on the president and 
prohibits any form of extension (article 35); it also prohibits amendments to the term limit 
provisions (article 153). To prevent a potential constitutional and power vacuum due to a 
failure to hold elections on time during the pandemic, legislators from the majority party, 
including the deputy speaker of the National Assembly, proposed constitutional amendments 
under the notion of ‘force majeure’ (Vohito 2020). They sought to amend article 36, which 
defines how long before the end of the incumbent’s term presidential elections must be held, 
and article 68, which prescribes the period within which legislative elections must be held. 
The proposed amendments received the support of two-thirds of members of the National 
Assembly and were formally endorsed in the Cabinet on 15 May. The draft amendments 
were then submitted for review to the Constitutional Court, as is required under 
constitutional amendment procedures. The court ruled that the Constitution includes 
‘constitutional locks’ that prevent any amendments to the number or duration of presidential 
terms. Thus, unlike the example from Sri Lanka, the CAR’s Constitutional Court acted as a 
safety valve on emergency power. However, the example illustrates problems associated with 
incomplete constitutions, which must be updated to cover new emergencies.
5.1. Complicating peaceful transfers of power
Elections in the context of Covid-19 can be understood in four ways. First, from a 
democracy-building perspective, elections are a central feature of transitions from conflict to 
peace. Delayed elections therefore stall a salient mechanism for allocating power that is often 
central to the peace deal. Second, decisions related to elections are merely another avenue 
through which conflict manifests in non-violent ways. The existence of fault lines ensures 
that decisions to either proceed or delay elections will be interpreted through different lenses. 
In some cases, these fault lines have escalated to violence, as the Ethiopian case demonstrates. 
Third, issues around elections in the context of Covid-19 expose limitations or grey areas in 
regard to constitutional frameworks. The constitutions of both Ethiopia and the CAR did 
not account for emergency situations such as a pandemic during which elections might not 
be possible. Finally, from these uncertainties, state institutions can demonstrate their capacity 
and willingness to contain executive measures when interpreted as constitutionally unsound.
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6. Substate governance in conflict-affected 
states in transition
When the origins of conflict revolve around identity, territorial power sharing is a device that 
is often used in peace settlements. These arrangements, which can involve federalism, 
autonomy or devolution, seek to stave off demands for secession while enabling substate 
entities to govern themselves. External shocks can undermine or test the relationship between 
the state and substate entities. Given the salience of these arrangements to peace, the 
potential for violence or undoing constitutional settlements are always risks.
6.1. Hindering ongoing or potential territorial arrangements
While Covid-19 has raised a range of issues relating to the relationship between central 
governments and subnational actors generally, the potential for conflict related to identity 
raises complexities in conflict-affected settings. In some countries undergoing transition, 
Covid-19 has hampered efforts to reach or implement the negotiated settlement. In Somalia, 
for instance, Blanc (2020) observes that political processes have further slowed as the 
pandemic has spread, including the dialogues between the federal government and the federal 
member states, which are necessary for the country’s  federal system to function. This 
highlights a more general difficulty related to peacebuilding and conflict mediation: where 
face-to-face contact is not possible, technological deficiencies that limit the ability to convene 
online can also hamper progress. Similarly, in South Sudan the delay in establishing a Unity 
Government has hindered the development of regional governance structures and 
contributed to the vacuum in governance. In other cases, transitions at substate levels are 
occurring alongside the pandemic. The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao, a new devolved administration in the southern Philippines, was one year into a 
complex transition period when the Covid-19 pandemic hit.
6.2. The emergency law response of the central state
Tensions can also emerge when the emergency law response is predicated on laws that 
predate the political settlement. In Nepal, federalism emerged as a hard-fought agenda of the 
peace process, which was codified in the 2015 Constitution. Yet the country’s federalization 
process remains incomplete, and many political parties continue to be ‘reluctant  federalists’ 
that are averse to fundamentally transforming the centralized system. Nepal enacted its 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2017 as one the first sectoral federal laws 
after the promulgation of the Constitution. The act defines pandemics as non-natural 
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disasters and sets out the institutional mechanisms for disaster management from the federal 
to the local level, specifying very clear roles and responsibilities for each level of government 
(Karki 2020). Yet in response to Covid-19, the Nepali Government invoked the Infectious 
Disease Control Act of 1964, which has a broad legal grounding that lacks specificity and 
does not clearly define what is permitted. Most importantly, the act does not specify the 
distribution of powers among different levels of government, which has made it difficult to 
implement in the new federal system.
6.3. Competing legal arrangements
Problems can stem from complex political and constitutional arrangements on multi-level 
governance set up in a political settlement. For instance, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
fragmented state structure has made crisis management more of a challenge, as the country 
failed to establish a central organization to coordinate the crisis response. This has resulted in 
competing overlapping legal frameworks and no clear understanding of which laws prevail. 
Territorial power-sharing arrangements can thus contribute to confusion about which laws 
apply and complicate coordination between different layers of governance. Ibezim-Ohaeri 
(2020) notes that in Nigeria, the maze of Covid-19-focused legal frameworks enacted at the 
federal and state levels is brewing political tension and jurisdictional confusion, which has 
locked the federal government into conflict with some of the constituent states of the 
republic. In Mexico, uncoordinated actions taken at the state and local levels, such as 
banning the sale of alcohol and instituting curfews, have created a complex web of 
contradictory laws.
6.4. Taking power from the peripheries
When emergency powers transfer power from substate units to the central state, this can 
damage relationships between different layers of government, particularly when the sharing 
of competences is a central component of the broader negotiated settlement or peace process. 
An example is Ethiopia’s regional elections. The balance of power between the federal and 
state governments in Ethiopia was central to the popular movement that precipitated the 
transition. Following the changes in leadership at the national level, the TPLF sought to 
maximize its regional autonomy from the national government. The tensions emanating 
from the pandemic emergency played into this contestation over the balance of power.
The emergency measures were largely led by the national government; there were no 
contestations over whether the national government had the mandate to take the necessary 
health measures. The TPLF also took other measures at the state level, but this was not 
contested by the federal authorities. The other regions took minimal measures that lasted for 
a short period. Because the national government took the lead, the coordination was 
generally achieved through its leadership. However, a key bone of contention emerged when 
the TPLF rejected the national government’s decision to postpone regional elections, arguing 
that decisions about regional elections should be taken at the regional rather than federal 
level. The TPLF adopted a new electoral law that established an election commission and 
organized regional elections in defiance of federal authorities in September 2020. The federal 
government then decided to direct federal transfers to local governments of Tigray, rather 
than the regional government. The TPLF announced that this constituted a ‘declaration of 
war’,  and threatened not to recognize federal authorities. The TPLF considers the 
postponement of elections in general as illegitimate and unconstitutional, and it had already 
said it would not recognize the federal government after the end of its original term. So this 
threat of derecognition preceded the federal cut of subsidies.
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All of this precipitated the civil war that erupted in November 2020. Following the defeat 
of the TPLF forces, the federal government established a transitional government in Tigray, 
which is expected to lead the region until elections can be held. This can also be seen in 
contexts experiencing devolution rather than federalism. As pre-existing or latent fault lines 
re-emerge in some settings, Covid-19 could serve as a catalyst for renewed conflict. This 
appears to have been the case in Ethiopia and Myanmar.
6.5. Capacity issues
The pandemic has also exposed difficulties in substate arrangements related to capacity. For 
instance, the 2010 Constitution of Kenya  reconfigured the balance of power by devolving 
authority and responsibilities from the national government to 47 elected county 
governments—creating a two-tier governance system. Health is a fully devolved function in 
Kenya but has been a recurring point of tension since the process of devolution began. A lack 
of resources—in terms of both financing and administrative capacity—has also been a major 
issue in key service delivery sectors, such as health; county governments are ill equipped to 
manage complex tasks such as dealing with this pandemic.
6.6. Summary—unbalancing fragile territorial power sharing
The pandemic and the response to it risk undermining existing territorial power-sharing 
arrangements. These risks revolve around the central state assuming responsibilities that are 
normally exercised by the substate entity. Limitations in existing arrangements are also 
exposed, including how overlapping jurisdictions are constructed under the law in multi- 
layered governance arrangements, the lack of coordination between different legal responses 
and the limited capacity of subnational entities to respond to crises. In some settings, the 
pandemic appears to have hindered transitions towards a constitutional and political 
settlement on devolved governance and regional autonomy, or progress in implementing an 
agreed settlement.
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What then for conflict-affected states in transition going forward? In some cases, Covid-19 
and/or the responses to it have been a catalyst for renewed conflict. Myanmar is again under 
a military regime. Ethiopia descended into conflict in December 2020 but has since renewed 
peace. While Covid-19 was not the central cause in either, it may have been a contributory 
factor by exacerbating, tangentially or directly, pre-pandemic fault lines. The Sri Lankan 
Government hoarded the credit for the pandemic response through the absence of 
parliamentary and judicial scrutiny to win a two-thirds majority in delayed parliamentary 
elections. It then used that majority to enact a constitutional amendment that formalized its 
executive aggrandizement. Tensions continue around the process of federalism in Nepal, and 
the Philippines is continuing towards deconsolidating democracy. In Iraq and Syria, non- 
state actors have been able to exploit the governments’  distraction with the pandemic 
response to increase attacks and undermine transitions.
In identifying potential areas of tension that pandemic response has exposed, the Dialogue 
highlighted five suggestions on how to emerge from the pandemic in ways that reduce the 
potential for existing fault lines to undermine transitions in the future.
• First, the pandemic has exposed limits and gaps in existing legal frameworks. In some 
cases, epidemics are not covered in constitutional provisions on emergency response, 
which limits decision-makers’ options. In others, outdated legislation has been 
exploited to engage in an emergency response that benefits the incumbent powers. 
There is an opportunity to update these legal groundings and to harmonize legal 
frameworks to ensure that a rule-of-law-based response can be adopted in the future. 
Similarly, there are opportunities to amend legislation to address the possibility that 
elections cannot be held, and to require electoral management bodies to take the 
necessary steps to plan for and mitigate the risks of future disruptions. In either case, 
the process of legal reform can help define the boundaries of emergency power in ways 
that are clear and constitutional.
• Second, the pandemic has exposed difficulties in some situations of multi-layered 
governance, particularly where arrangements are complex and identity driven, and 
provides an opportunity to address these weaknesses. Efforts could be focused on 
redrafting laws or clarifying constitutional arrangements on issues of overlapping 
jurisdiction and distribution of powers. This process should entail properly 
delineating responsibilities, addressing the lack of intergovernmental coordination 
mechanisms and institutions and their capacity, and building the capacity of substate 
entities to respond to external shocks.
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• Third, in such contexts as South Sudan and Somalia, but also Nepal, the pandemic 
could galvanize the process of moving towards a negotiated decentralized system of 
governance. As countries such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka undermine transitions 
towards democracy, opposition may continue to grow, pushing for reform and 
change. Therefore, recognizing the problems associated with systems in transition 
could provide the impetus for further democratization, particularly from civil society. 
This could include working with political party representatives to understand the legal 
framework that may be used in emergencies, and its limitations, as well as the issues 
(e.g. related to rights or the rule of law) they need to pay special attention to.
• Fourth, in conflict-affected situations, particularly those in which increased autonomy 
for identity-based groups is integral to a negotiated transition, the pandemic has 
reshaped incentives and the relative positions of state and non-state parties to the 
process. In some cases, pandemic responses have galvanized effective coordination 
among territorially concentrated opposition forces and the central government. In 
others, non-state actors have exploited the divided attentions and strained resources of 
formal state authorities to increase violence and undermine the transition. Parties to 
negotiations can learn from the mutual and distinct challenges associated with the 
pandemic response when seeking to forge peace agreements and concretize stagnated 
decentralization or federalization processes. While loopholes for exploitation during 
exogenous shocks can never be entirely closed, the pandemic experience highlights the 
importance and urgency of redoubling efforts to strengthen coordination mechanisms 
between these stakeholders, and to enhance relevant state logistical capacities and 
networks to mitigate the risk that future shocks will undermine governance 
credibility.
• Finally, the pandemic has brought into stark relief the continued existence of fault 
lines that, despite progress in building peace or democracy, remain—and retain the 
capacity to resurface as contentious, partisan conflict drivers. In recognizing the 
potential for these fault lines to undermine transitions, renewed efforts can focus on 
building institutional mechanisms for reconciliation and cooperation between groups, 
and on entrenching, as appropriate, constitutional and other safeguards to mitigate 
the risk that dominant parties will unilaterally and opportunistically undermine long- 
standing political settlements and erode democratic conventions.
32   International IDEA




too-little-too-late>, accessed 8 March 2021
—, ‘Kenyan police “killed 15” since start of coronavirus curfew’, 5 June 2020b, <https:// 
www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/5/kenyan-police-killed-15-since-start-of-coronavirus- 
curfew>, accessed 13 Match 2021
Alihodžić, S. and Matatu, N., Timing and Sequencing of Transitional Elections, Policy Paper 
No. 18 (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.31752/idea. 
2019.13>
Asal, V., Flanigan, S. and Szekely, O., ‘Doing good while killing: why some insurgent groups 
provide community services’, Terrorism and Political Violence (2020), <https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/09546553.2020.1745775>
Banbury, A., ‘Opinion: Elections and COVID-19 – what we learned from Ebola’, Devex, 8 
April 2020, <https://www.devex.com/news/opinion-elections-and-covid-19-what-we- 
learnedfrom-ebola-96903>, accessed 13 March 2021
Bell, C., ‘Peace settlements and human rights: A post-Cold War circular history’, Journal of 
Human Rights Practice, 9/3 (2017), pp. 358–78, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/ 
hux025>
—, ‘COVID-19 and violent conflict: responding to predictable unpredictability’, Just 
Security, 24 March 2020, <https://www.justsecurity.org/69340/covid-19-and-violent- 
conflict-responding-to-predictable-unpredictability/>, accessed 8 March 2021
Blanc, T. B., ‘Somalia and coronavirus’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 
April 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/14/somalia-and-coronavirus- 



















Convention on Human Rights to entrenched emergencies’, Yale Journal of International 
Law, 23/1 (1998)
Hege, S., ‘COVID-19 and conflict: Colombia’, United States Institute for Peace, 6 August 
2020, <https://www.usip.org/blog/2020/08/covid-19-and-conflict-colombia>, accessed 
8 March 2021
Ibezim-Ohaeri, V., ‘COVID-19 and the shrinking civic space in Nigeria’, Just Security, 19 
May 2020, <https://www.justsecurity.org/70226/covid-19-and-the-shrinking-civic- 
space-in-nigeria/>, accessed 8 March 2021
International IDEA, ‘Global overview of COVID-19: Impact on elections’, 8 March 2020a, 
<https://www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19- 
impact-elections>, accessed 8 March 2021
—, The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Constitutionalism and The Rule of Law in East 





Karki, B., Multi-Level Government and COVID-19: Nepal as a Case Study (International 





and emergencies’, Minnesota Journal of International Law, 25/1 (2016), pp. 29–77, 
<https://minnjil.org/archives-2/volume-25/volume-25-issue-1/>, accessed 18 March 
2021
34   International IDEA
Emergency Law Responses to Covid-19 and the Impact on Peace and Transition Processes
Lexology, ‘Coronavirus: Angola-State of public calamity and state of emergency’, 8 June 
2020, <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63b71d23-b66f-4690- 
adbd-567d1ee8bffc>, accessed 13 March 2021
Lührmann, A. and Rooney, B., Autocratization by Decree: States of Emergency and Democratic 





constitutional-court-broken-shield-overseeing-executive-emergencies>, accessed 8 
March 2021
Meyer, B., ‘Pandemic populism: an analysis of populist leaders’ responses to COVID-19’, 










Ní Aoláin, F. and Gross, O., Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
O’Connor, P., ‘East Timor records first confirmed coronavirus case amid floods’, World 
Socialist Web Site, 27 March 2020, <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/03/25/ 
timo-m27.html>, accessed 8 March 2021
Paris, R., At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790836>
Parlevliet, M., ‘Human rights and peacebuilding: complementary and contradictory, 
complex and contingent’, Journal of Human Rights Practice, 9/3 (2017), pp. 333–57, 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/hux032>
Patel, C., ‘How COVID-19 infected human rights protection’, East Asian Forum, 17 
December 2020, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/12/17/how-covid-19-infected- 
human-rights-protection/>, accessed 8 March 2021
Polo, S. M. T., ‘A pandemic of violence? The impact of COVID-19 on conflict’, Peace 






Repucci, S. and Slipowitz, A., Democracy under Lockdown: The Impact of COVID-19 on the 
Global Struggle for Freedom (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2020), <https:// 
freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/COVID-19_Special_Report_Final_.pdf>, 
accessed 8 March 2021
Schiavi, F. S., ‘Re-imagining hybrid MENA actors in the time of Covid-19’, Italian Institute 
for International Political Studies, 7 May 2020, <https://www.ispionline.it/en/ 
pubblicazione/re-imagining-hybrid-mena-actors-time-covid-19-26012>, accessed 8 
March 2021
Srinivasan, M., ‘Sri Lanka’s top court dismisses petitions challenging poll date’, The Hindu, 2 
June 2020, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/sri-lankas-top-court- 





legislative-terms-central-african>, accessed 8 March 2021
Welikala, A. ‘COVID-19: Southasian states of emergency’, Himal SouthAsian, 26 March 
2020a, <https://www.himalmag.com/covid-19-southasian-states-of-emergency- 
interview-2020/>, accessed 8 March 2021
—, ‘Dead or tranquilised? The recall of dissolved parliaments’, Groundviews, 23 May 2020b, 
<https://groundviews.org/2020/05/23/dead-or-tranquilised-the-recall-of-dissolved- 
parliaments/>, accessed 8 March 2021
36   International IDEA
Emergency Law Responses to Covid-19 and the Impact on Peace and Transition Processes
Annex. Agenda







Christine Bell, Professor of Constitutional Law; Director, Global Justice Academy, Edinburgh University 
Asanga Welikala, Director, Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law 
Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher, Acting Head, Constitution-Building Programme, International IDEA
14:15– 
15:15
Session I: Introductions to the conceptual framework on the interaction between the way in which conflict- 
affected countries have dealt with the Covid-19 emergency and the development of existing transitions to peace 
and democracy 
Moderator: Sumit Bisarya, Constitutions Advisor, United Nations Department for Peacebuilding and Political Affairs  
 
Christine Bell, Professor of Constitutional Law; Director, Global Justice Academy, Edinburgh University 
Joelle Grogan, Senior Lecturer in law at Middlesex University London, coordinator of the Symposium on COVID-19 and 
states of emergency, hosted by the Verfassungsblog on Matters Constitutional and Democracy Reporting International 
Fionnuala Ní Aolain, holds the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; Regents Professor and Robina Chair in Law, Public Policy, and 






Session II: Typology of emergency law responses to Covid-19 and its impact on conflict dynamics (including long- 
term conflict resolution dynamics) 
 
While Covid-19 has elicited different types of responses from different countries, in this panel we will explore case 
studies in an attempt to develop a taxonomy of emergency law responses for conflict-affected countries. What are key 
determinants for emergency law responses and the way they have been institutionalized in different country contexts, 
and how have these impacted both conflict dynamics and transitions to both peace and democracy? Beyond this, 
what is the likelihood of specific emergency legal responses becoming encroached, and what is the impact of such an 
encroachment on conflict resolution/transformation dynamics?
Moderator: Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, Ludwig and Hilde Wolf Research Scholar, 
Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago 
 
Case studies: 
Marcus Brand, Head of Mission, International IDEA Myanmar  
Sonia Vohito, coordinator of the Africa Project of The Global Initiative to End Corporal Punishment, and PhD 
candidate at the University of Pretoria, South Africa (Central African Republic)  









Session III: Emergency law responses to Covid-19 and specific impact on (i) electoral democracy; and 
(ii) relationships between the centre and the periphery 
This panel will explore the additional impact of Covid-19 on scheduled elections, and thereby on conflict dynamics, 
and whether the level of virulence of the pandemic may or not have played a role in considering election 
postponement. Beyond elections, this panel will also explore ways in which dealing with the pandemic may have 
impacted the relationship between the centre and the periphery, in terms of coordination or centralization of power, 
and how the latter may influence broader conflict dynamics but also decentralization in the framework of broader 
peace processes.
Moderator: Jason Gluck, Policy Specialist, Political Dialogues and Constitutional Processes, at the Rule of Law, 
Security and Human Rights for Sustainable Peace and Development Team, Crises Bureau, United Nations 
Development Programme  
 
Case studies: 
Adem Abebe, Constitution Building Advisor, International IDEA (Ethiopia) 
Monalisa Adhikari, Researcher at the Political Settlement Research Programme (Nepal)  







Session IV: Concluding remarks and closing 
 
This final session will focus on factors that may contribute particularly in conflict-affected settings to a particular legal 
response in the context of a pandemic, based on the case studies presented, but also on other cases that may have 
been mentioned throughout the webinar. Are conflict-affected settings fundamentally different in their response to 
Covid-19 than other countries? And what can we say about the impact of Covid-19 on their ‘twin transitions’ to peace 
and democracy?
Panellists: 
Christine Bell  




Emergency Law Responses to Covid-19 and the Impact on Peace and Transition Processes
About the author
Sean Molloy  is a Lecturer at Northumbria Law School and an affiliate of the Political 
Settlements Research Programme, University of Edinburgh. He holds a PhD from 
Edinburgh University and degrees from Queen’s University, Belfast, University of Ulster and 
Liverpool John Moore’s. Sean teaches various public law and criminal law courses, as well as 
delivering training on police powers to police trainees at Durham Constabulary. He has 
published in the areas of international human rights law, constitutional law and transitional 




The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is 
an intergovernmental organization with the mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a 
universal human aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this by 
supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions 
and processes at all levels. Our vision is a world in which democratic processes, actors and 
institutions are inclusive and accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.
What do we do?
In our work we focus on three main impact areas: electoral processes; constitution-building 
processes; and political participation and representation. The themes of gender and inclusion, 
conflict sensitivity and sustainable development are mainstreamed across all our areas of 
work.
International IDEA provides analyses of global and regional democratic trends; produces 
comparative knowledge on good international democratic practices; offers technical 
assistance and capacity-building on democratic reform to actors engaged in democratic 
processes; and convenes dialogue on issues relevant to the public debate on democracy and 
democracy building.
Where do we work?
Our headquarters is located in Stockholm, and we have regional and country offices in 
Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. International IDEA 




The World Health Organization declared the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic 
on 11 March 2020. This global health crisis demanded a quick, decisive and efficient 
response by governments to protect lives, curb the spread of the virus and prevent 
public health systems from being overwhelmed.
This report explores the way governments undergoing transitions to peace and 
democracy  have triggered emergency legal frameworks to disable some ordinary 
(democratic) procedures and set aside standard political and legal accountability 
mechanisms as part of their Covid-19 response. It also provides information about 
where elections have been postponed or cancelled, and central governments have 
assumed enhanced responsibilities, which have often included powers otherwise 
designated to local or regional governments. While the impacts of both the pandemic 
and the responses to the contagion have been felt globally, they often have quite different 
consequences in countries attempting peace and democratic transition processes.
In December 2020, International IDEA—together with the Edinburgh Centre 
for Constitutional Law, the Global Justice Academy and the Political Settlements 
Research Programme at the University of Edinburgh, and with financial support 
from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)—hosted the 
Seventh Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building. The Edinburgh 
Dialogue is an annual event that brings together experts and practitioners from the 
fields of constitution-building, conflict resolution and mediation to advance research 





Telephone: +46 8 698 37 00
Email: info@idea.int
Website: <http://www.idea.int> ISBN: 978-91-7671-401-0 (PDF)
